The Enforcement of International Judgments by Reisman, W. Michael
HeinOnline -- 62 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 13 1968
13
arise again in connection with United Nations responsibilities for the ad-
ministration of South West Africa.
The second question is whether the General Assembly itself may take
enforcement-like action. Again it is clear that the General Assembly
cannot order enforcement action. But you are all aware of the issue as
to whether an Assembly recommendation may form the basis for such
action by Member States. The United Nations action in Korea was in
response to a Security Council "recommendation" rather than a "de-
cision" and the Uniting For Peace Resolution was originally intended,
and initially applied, to enable a similar action in response to General
Assembly recommendations. It was contended that while primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is
vested in the Security Council, a residual authority must lie with the
General Assembly when the Security Council is unable to take action.
Subsequently of course, the Uniting For Peace Resolution has been used
for peace-keeping operations undertaken with the consent not only of
participating states but also of the state or states directly concerned.
Even these consensual operations are the subject of challenge and contro-
versy. However, the General Assembly continues to adopt at each session
by large majorities resolutions calling on states to apply economic mea-
sures similar to those described in Article 41 and in resolutions on
Southern Rhodesia has called on the United Kingdom, as the administering
authority, to take all necessary measures "including in particular the
use of force. "
I have not attempted to draw conclusions, but merely to sketch the
background and pose a few illustrati:ve problems. I would suggest, how-
ever, that questions of implementation and enforcement of decisions of
international organizations are central to the larger question of organizing
our international community for survival in this nuclear age. I would
also submit that the problems are more a dearth of will than of ways.
As has been said so frequently of sanctions under the League, it was not
so much that they were tried and found wanting, but that they were found
difficult and not tried at all. One may wonder how different the world
might be today if the United Nations had grappled successfully with these
problems in the :first days of its creation. Fortunately, it is not yet too
late.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
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Yale Law School
Judgment enforcement is not a problem unique to international law.
That persistent ontological assumption of the law-that a judgment is a
decision-obscures the fact that statements made in a court room are
simply words-signs and aymbols. These words may indeed carry some
potential for compulsion. They may activate certain inculcated pre-
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dispositions in the target audience to which they are directed and the
audience may, as a result, regulate its collective behavior in conformity
with the policy prescription of the judgment. But whether, to what de-
gree and under what circumstances words will contribute toward realiza-
tion of the desired social goal will depend upon numerous contextual
factors.
Judgment enforcement generally refers to a sequential phase after a
judgment has been delivered and before its pronouncement has bcen
realized in terms of eoncrete value allocation. We tend to conceive of
enforcement as a process discrete from the adjudicative proeeedings
which precede it. For this reason, there has been some apathy among
legal specialists to give enforcement, whether on the municipal or the
international level, any detailed consideration. But law, in any meaning-
ful social sense, must connote effective as well as authoritative decision.
Hence, decision, in all its diverse functions, must constantly consider en-
forcement and enforceability. Approached from this perspective, it will
become readily apparent that the process of enforcement does not begin
after a judgment has been delivered; it begins with the very initiation of
the case. Under certain circumstances, it may be a critical factor in de-
ciding whether to initiate the judicial process at all. It will also become
apparent that the process of judgment enforcement is no more mechanical
than the process of judicial application. Each of its component sequences
presents difficult and complex policy choices.
In developing a socially relevant and useful conception of judgment en-
forcement, then, we must emphasize the essential integrality of all de-
cision functions. Judgments alone do not make law. The procedures
by which policy is clarified, authorized and realized, in short, in which
decisions are made, are executed in a number of different functions. The
court phase represents at best one of them. If that phase is not executed
after consideration has been given to all relevant preceding and subse-
quent phases, adjudication will be no more than an exercise in pretended
power.
In an arena of a relatively low degree of organization, the objective of
an enforcer cannot restrict itself to the mere realization of a particular
judgment. Of equal and, at times significantly greater importance, is the
constitutive aspect of the problem. The constitutive goal is the creation
of conditions facilitating voluntary compliance with and, where neces-
sary, economic and expeditious enforcement of international judgments.
Whether this means the creation of an international enforcement mecha-
nism, comparable to municipal institutions, such as that envisaged in
Charter Article 94(2), or whether radically different structures, dictated
by power allocations in the world arena, are preferable, the point of
emphasis remains. At each phase of the process of enforcement, decision-
makers must constantly consider both short-range enforcement require-
ments as well as the long-range constitutive impacts of their decisions.
Doctrinal disquisition of enforcement takes the concept of "finality"
as its touchstone for goal consideration. Judgments are to be treated
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